[PATCH] smbfs chroot issue (CVE-2006-1864)

Mark Moseley reported that a chroot environment on a SMB share can be left
via "cd ..\\".  Similar to CVE-2006-1863 issue with cifs, this fix is for
smbfs.

Steven French <[email protected]> wrote:

Looks fine to me.  This should catch the slash on lookup or equivalent,
which will be all obvious paths of interest.

Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

diff --git a/fs/smbfs/dir.c b/fs/smbfs/dir.c
index 34c7a11d91f0ebbb29854a0116d8c558825fbbbc..70d9c5a37f5a3c6f7d5cad12e7bad8e1d2e21136 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/smbfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/smbfs/dir.c
@@ -434,6 +434,11 @@ smb_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
        if (dentry->d_name.len > SMB_MAXNAMELEN)
                goto out;
 
+       /* Do not allow lookup of names with backslashes in */
+       error = -EINVAL;
+       if (memchr(dentry->d_name.name, '\\', dentry->d_name.len))
+               goto out;
+
        lock_kernel();
        error = smb_proc_getattr(dentry, &finfo);
 #ifdef SMBFS_PARANOIA