perf/x86/intel/pt: Do validate the size of a kernel address filter

Right now, the kernel address filters in PT are prone to integer overflow
that may happen in adding filter's size to its offset to obtain the end
of the range. Such an overflow would also throw a #GP in the PT event
configuration path.

Fix this by explicitly validating the result of this calculation.

Reported-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.7
Cc: [email protected]#v4.7
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
index 1f94963a283b108984c7cb142ee43e32847275c5..861a7d9cb60f6c1c19b560a4912c7eef1effd8b3 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
@@ -1089,8 +1089,13 @@ static int pt_event_addr_filters_validate(struct list_head *filters)
                if (!filter->range || !filter->size)
                        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-               if (!filter->inode && !valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset))
-                       return -EINVAL;
+               if (!filter->inode) {
+                       if (!valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset))
+                               return -EINVAL;
+
+                       if (!valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset + filter->size))
+                               return -EINVAL;
+               }
 
                if (++range > pt_cap_get(PT_CAP_num_address_ranges))
                        return -EOPNOTSUPP;